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Perception is an inferential process, which becomes immediately evident when sensory
information is conﬂicting or ambiguous and thus allows for more than one perceptual
interpretation. Thinking the idea of perception as inference through to the end results in a
blurring of boundaries between perception and action selection, as perceptual inference
implies the construction of a percept as an active process. Here we therefore wondered
whether perception shares a key characteristic of action selection, namely that it is
shaped by reinforcement learning. In two behavioral experiments, we used binocular
rivalry to examine whether perceptual inference can be inﬂuenced by the association of
perceptual outcomes with reward or punishment, respectively, in analogy to instrumental
conditioning. Binocular rivalry was evoked by two orthogonal grating stimuli presented to
the two eyes, resulting in perceptual alternations between the two gratings. Perception
was tracked indirectly and objectively through a target detection task, which allowed
us to preclude potential reporting biases. Monetary reward or punishments were given
repeatedly during perception of only one of the two rivaling stimuli.We found an increase in
dominance durations for the percept associated with reward, relative to the non-rewarded
percept. In contrast, punishment led to an increase of the non-punished compared to a
relative decrease of the punished percept. Our results show that perception shares key
characteristics with action selection, in that it is inﬂuenced by reward and punishment in
opposite directions, thus narrowing the gap between the conceptually separated domains
of perception and action selection. We conclude that perceptual inference is an adaptive
process that is shaped by its consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
We perceive the world through our senses, but the sensory input
that reaches our brains is a fundamentally impoverished source
of information about the external world. Our brains must go
beyond what is directly available in the sensory data through a
process of interpretation, or inference, to achieve the rich per-
cepts of conscious awareness. Accordingly, current theories of
brain function consider perception an active inference process,
in which the contents of conscious perception are generated by
neural computations that rest on predictive models of how the
sensory data are caused (Friston, 2005). Thinking the notion
of perception as an active inference process through to the end
inevitably leads to a blurring of boundaries between the con-
ceptually separated domains of perception and action, because
perceptual inference implies the construction of perceptual expe-
rience as an active process. Consequently, it is plausible to assume
that this active perceptual process is shaped according to the
same principles as actions in the strict sense. A key character-
istic of actions is that they are modulated by learning through
reinforcement and punishment, which is known as instrumen-
tal conditioning (Skinner, 1938). According to the ‘law of effect’
(Thorndike, 1911), actions leading to favorable outcomes aremore
likely to be selected again in the future,while aversive consequences
lower the probability of an action. Here we reasoned that this law
might not only apply to actions, but also to the active process
of perceptual inference. In other words, association of a percep-
tual experience with favorable consequences should increase the
probability of this particular outcome of perceptual inference in
the future, while aversive consequences should conversely decrease
this probability.
Previous studies have demonstrated a modulation of percep-
tual inference by value (Proshansky and Murphy, 1942; Schafer
and Murphy, 1943; Haggard and Rose, 1944; Alpers et al., 2005;
Balcetis and Dunning, 2006; Fleming et al., 2010; Summerﬁeld
and Koechlin, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011c; Balcetis et al., 2012;
see also Riccio et al., 2013, for review). For example, ambigu-
ous face-house images (overlaid pictures that could be perceived
as either a house or a face) were more often categorized as
houses when pay-off matrices suggested this perceptual decision
to be advantageous (Fleming et al., 2010). This is in line with
a number of other ﬁndings that suggest that uncertainty with
regard to a percept (e.g., due to ambiguous or noisy stimuli),
is resolved in accordance not only with expectations (Schmack
et al., 2013), but also current needs (Sanford, 1936; Balcetis
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and Dunning, 2010; Radel and Clement-Guillotin, 2012), and
emotional states (Stefanucci et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2011b;
Sterzer et al., 2011). However, most of these studies relied on
participants’ report of what they see and methodological con-
cerns have repeatedly been raised (Erdelyi, 1974; Firestone and
Scholl, 2014). Obviously, in the context of motivational and emo-
tional factors, the participants’ reports of what they perceive are
likely to be inﬂuenced by what they wish to perceive in order
to obtain a favorable outcome (cf. reward response bias, Rees
and Fishbein, 1970) as well as by what they think the exper-
imenter wishes them to see (cf. social factors in experiments,
Orne, 1962). A key challenge when investigating the effect of
reinforcement on perception is thus to preclude confounding
effects from such biases. We therefore devised an experimental
paradigm in which subjective perceptual experience was indi-
rectly inferred from an orthogonal target detection task (similar
to Yu and Blake, 1992; Nguyen et al., 2001; Chong et al., 2005;
Alpers and Gerdes, 2007; Balcetis et al., 2012). This procedure pro-
vided us with an objective measure of the participants’ subjective
perceptual experience, thus precluding any voluntary reporting
bias.
The aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis that
perceptual inference is shaped by instrumental learning according
to the same principles as action selection. The inferential nature
of perception is immediately evident in situations where sensory
information is ambiguous or conﬂicting. A typical example is
binocular rivalry,which is evokedby thepresentationof incompat-
ible images to the two eyes, resulting in spontaneous alternation
between the two possible outcomes of inference and thus per-
ception of either one or the other image at a time (Blake and
Logothetis, 2002; Tong et al., 2006). Here we used binocular rivalry
to probe the effect of instrumental conditioning on perceptual
inference. In two behavioral experiments, we coupled perception
of only one of two rivaling grating stimuli with monetary reward
or punishment, respectively.
According to our hypothesis that perceptual inference is shaped
by instrumental learning, we expected that reward should bias
inference toward the associated perceptual outcome, leading to
increased dominance durations for the rewarded percept during
binocular rivalry. Conversely, we expected decreased dominance
durations for the perceptual outcome associatedwith punishment.
Importantly, the punishment condition was critical for distin-
guishing the effects of instrumental conditioning from those of
affective stimulus salience. Previous research suggests that the
affective salience of a stimulus facilitates its perception under con-
ditions of binocular rivalry, both for stimuli with positive and
negative valence (Alpers et al., 2005; Alpers and Gerdes, 2007;
Stein and Sterzer, 2012). If coupling of a perceptual outcome
with punishment enhanced the salience of the respective grat-
ing stimulus, one would expect increased dominance durations
for this stimulus, as previously reported for effects of classical
fear conditioning (Alpers et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2011c).
In contrast, if perceptual inference is shaped by instrumen-
tal conditioning, one would expect avoidance of the punished
perceptual outcome and thus decreased dominance durations,
in analogy to instrumental conditioning of decision or action
selection.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-seven participants completed Experiment 1, 34 completed
Experiment 2. All volunteers gave written informed consent to
participation in this study, which was approved by the local ethics
committee of Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin. Participants
were right-handed and mostly medical students (Experiment 1:
11 males, 26 females, Experiment 2: 15 males, 19 females),
aged 18–32 (M = 23.68, SD = 2.92) and 18–35 (M = 23.09,
SD = 3.74) in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Participants
had no mental or neurological disorders and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision (the only tolerated exception was
corrected-to-normal vision through contact lenses; none of the
participants suffered from strabismus). They were naïve with
regard to binocular rivalry andhadnever participated in any vision
experiment before.
MATERIAL
Participants sat in a quiet and dark room in front of a computer
screen (60 Hz). They watched stimuli through a mirror stereo-
scope (see Figure 1A). Two red or blue rotating grating stimuli,
adapted from Haynes and Rees (2005), were used in a binocular
rivalry paradigm, i.e., one stimulus was presented to the right eye
and one to the left (color and eye were counterbalanced across
participants). As a consequence, conscious perception alternated
continuously between the two stimuli. Each stimulus consisted of
an annulus-shaped square-wave grating (1.0◦ visual angle width
of stripes, 1.3 and 11.6◦ visual angle diameter of inner and outer
circle, respectively), spatially smoothed in front of a black back-
ground (0.74 cd/m2). Grating stimuli were oriented orthogonally
and rotated with 360◦ per second around a central dot (0.5◦ visual
angle diameter, colored red or blue, respectively). The brightness
of the red stimulus was ﬁxed at 10.2 cd/m2, whereas the blue stim-
ulus was individually adjusted to match the brightness of the red
stimulus (on average 6.7 cd/m2, range 4.7–8.0 cd/m2; seeProcedure
below).
Targets were small circular areas (3.7◦ visual angle diameter)
within which the grating was spatially smoothed (see Figure 1C).
Presentation of these targets was faded in and out over 700 ms.
Target stimuli did not rotate like the grating stimuli but remained
stationary. Twoparameters that had an effect on the visibility of the
target were individually adjusted for each participant in order to
achieveoptimal performanceon the target detection task (smooth-
ness of the target border as deﬁned by the border width: M = 0.3◦
visual angle, range 0.2–0.5; and degree of smoothing of the back-
ground grating within the target area as deﬁned by the FWHM of
a Gaussian Filter: M = 2.8◦ visual angle, range 2.5–3.0). Target
stimuli appeared randomly at four possible positions (up, down,
left, and right) with an inter-stimulus-interval of 675ms (±200ms
jitter) and had to be reported by pressing one of four keys. In line
with a previous report of a strong reduction in contrast sensitiv-
ity on the currently non-dominant eye (Baker and Cass, 2013),
it was possible to render targets effectively invisible on the sup-
pressed eye but still clearly visible on the dominant eye (Chong
et al., 2005). Using an alternating presentation scheme of targets
on the left- and right-eye stimulus then allowed us to track domi-
nance and suppression of the rivaling gratings indirectly based on
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. (A) Binocular rivalry setup. Red and blue
grating stimuli were presented to the left and right eye separately using a
mirror stereoscope. As a consequence, conscious visual perception
alternated spontaneously between the two stimuli. (B)Target stimuli (here
indicated as small black squares) were presented alternatingly superimposed
on the two grating stimuli in four possible positions and had to be reported by
the participant using key presses. Targets on the currently dominant stimulus
were clearly visible whereas those on the currently suppressed stimulus were
invisible. Correct responses to a target, i.e., correct identiﬁcation of the target
position (here indicated by a yellow circle), was therefore used to indirectly
assess the current conscious perception of the participant. (C) Example of a
target, i.e., a small smoothed disk upon the grating stimulus (here depicted in
the top position). (D) Experimental Design comprising 10 blocks with 3 min
each, separated in baseline, conditioning, and extinction blocks. During the
conditioning blocks, one of the two percepts was rewarded (Experiment 1) or
punished (Experiment 2) by monetary gains and losses, respectively.
correctly detected and missed targets, respectively (see Figure 1B
and Figure S3 in the Supplementary Material for more details).
Catch trials with targets presented simultaneously on both stimuli
(at the same position) were randomly interspersed at every 35th
target presentation on average.
PROCEDURE
At the beginning participants were instructed about the general
procedure and the task. In Experiment 1, they were informed
about a starting balance of € 8, and that they could win money
throughout the task up to a balance of € 20; in Experiment 2,
they started at a balance of € 25 and were informed that they
would lose money during the task. Without looking through the
mirror stereoscope, participants were ﬁrst shown the stimulus in
gray as well as an example target upon it. Next, the mirror stere-
oscope was adjusted individually to ensure proper fusion of the
dichoptically presented images. Importantly, participants were
kept naïve with regard to dichoptic presentation by using only
identical stimuli for left and right eye during mirror adjustment.
After that, the colors of the rivaling stimuli were made equilu-
minant using heterochromatic ﬂicker photometry (Rood, 1893).
In brief, red and blue frames alternated while participants mini-
mized subjectively perceived ﬂickering by adjusting the luminance
of the blue stimulus. Finally, before starting the main experiment,
participants performed several blocks of training on the target
detection task with the rivaling stimuli. They were instructed
to report every target they detected by pressing one of the four
arrow buttons on a computer keyboard (up, down, left, or right).
Furthermore, it was stated that response time did not matter
as long as the response appeared within a time window of 1 s.
During training, target visibility was high in the beginning and
was continuously reduced from block to block in order to meet
the criteria of (a) no more than two consecutive targets missed,
and (b) no more than two consecutive targets hit (note: con-
secutive targets appeared alternating on the left and right eye).
With rule (a), we aimed to minimize the amount of time during
which participants did not respond to any targets, neither those
presented on the left nor those on the right eye (because no per-
cept could be inferred for this period of time). With rule (b),
we aimed to minimize the amount of time during which partic-
ipants responded to targets presented on both eyes, i.e., targets
on the left as well as the right eye (because, again, we would
not be able to infer the percept based on such performance).
Target visibility was adjusted manually by the experimenter (via
adaptation of target area and border smoothness, see Material
section above) after each of three or more training runs. Opti-
mal adjustment of target visibility to meet these two criteria
overall was achieved after 3.5–12.4 min of training (M = 6.2,
SD = 1.8).
The main task consisted of 10 blocks of 3 min each, divided
into three baseline, four conditioning, and three extinction blocks
(see Figure 1D). Participants knew that no reward or punishment
was delivered at the beginning of the task. Immediately before
the fourth block, i.e., before the start of the ﬁrst conditioning
block, the following additional instruction was given: ‘From now
on, you will sometimes hear the sound of a falling coin during
one of the colors (red or blue) and this means that € 0.10 have
been added to (Experiment 1)/subtracted from (Experiment 2)
your balance. Your task is still to respond to every target you
see, just as before.’ Reward/punishment was delivered every 2 s
during the continuous percept of one stimulus with a probabil-
ity of 50% (partial reinforcement schedule). Exact delivery time
was determined on the basis of cumulative percept duration and
was therefore not systematically related to percept onset or but-
ton press. During extinction blocks no reward/punishment was
delivered any more.
At the end of the experiment, participants were reimbursed
(according to their ﬁnal balance) and answered a written question
about possible strategies during the task. In a semi-structured ver-
bal interview, participants were asked about their own hypotheses
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regarding the experiment, the origin of color changes (self-
induced or physical changes on the computer screen), any
association with reward/punishment delivery, possible associa-
tions between this delivery and color of the stimulus, as well as
a 2-alternative forced choice (2AFC) question regarding color and
reward/punishment (red or blue).
ANALYSIS
Monetary gains (Experiment 1) and losses (Experiment 2) were
delivered contingent onparticipants’conscious perception. To that
aim, conscious perception had to be inferred online (i.e., during
the experiment) fromperformance in the target detection task (see
also Figure S3 in the Supplementary Material for an illustration).
Estimated perception was re-evaluated after each target based on
the following rule: A stimulus is considered perceptually dom-
inant if the last target presented on that stimulus was correctly
detected (hit) and if the last and/or next target on the stimu-
lus presented to the respective other eye was missed. Hits were
deﬁned as correct identiﬁcation of a targets’ location via button
press (up, down, left, or right) within a time window of 1 s after
50% of full target presentation (targets were faded in and out,
see above), misses were deﬁned as no response within this time
window or wrong localization of the current target. Main out-
come measures were median dominance durations based on the
target detection performance. Effects of reward and punishment
were tested comparing the two percepts during conditioning, cor-
rected by the corresponding difference during baseline in paired
t-tests:
(RewardedConditioning − RewardedBaseline) vs.
(NonrewardedConditioning − NonrewardedBaseline)
(PunishedConditioning − PunishedBaseline) vs.
(NonpunishedConditioning − NonpunishedBaseline)
This was done in order to account for possible general changes
in task performance (perceptual learning with regard to target
detection, higher task motivation during conditioning) as well as
potential baseline differences between the two percepts. Statisti-
cal tests were two-tailed, except for the main directed hypothesis
regarding a reward effect in Experiment 1. Error bars in ﬁgures
denote within-subject SEs (Cousineau, 2005).
In Experiment 1,we additionally performedone runwith direct
perceptual reports to validate our procedure of assessing domi-
nance duration based on the target detection task. Before training,
participants were asked to report red and blue percepts using two
buttons during a 3-min presentation of the original binocular
rivalry stimuli (red and blue on the left and right eye, respectively,
counterbalanced across participants). Average percept durations
based on this direct report were compared to average percept dura-
tions derived from the target detection performance during the
next succeeding run after training (ﬁrst baseline run) using Pear-
son correlation coefﬁcient (note, since this correlation refers to
different runs it cannot be expected to be perfect given random
changes in binocular rivalry dynamics over time). In addition, dis-
tributions of percept durations from all blocks of Experiment 1
were compared to distributions of these directly reported percept
durations using paired t-tests on the parameters of ﬁtted gamma
functions.
RESULTS
In Experiment 1, analysis of target detection performance revealed
a hit rate of M = 92.56% (SD = 5.97) for catch trials (i.e., targets
that could be detected independently of the current percept). Aver-
age percept durations determined by the target detection task were
signiﬁcantly correlated with percept durations derived from direct
report of participants as veriﬁed in an independent experimental
run [r(35) = 0.55, p< 0.001] but were generally longer (M = 6.08,
SD = 3.37 s) than those directly reported [M = 4.63, SD = 1.93 s;
t(36) = 2.91, p = 0.006]. Distributions of perceptual dominance
durations were skewed and could be approximated by a non-
symmetrical gamma function (see Figure 2). A comparison of the
parameters of gamma functions ﬁtted to each participant’s unnor-
malized percept durations showed no signiﬁcant difference for the
scale parameter θ [target detection task: M = 3.07, SD = 2.43;
direct report: M = 2.20, SD = 4.06; t(36) = −1.16, p = 0.255,
paired t-test] but a difference for the shape parameter κ [target
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of normalized percept durations of Experiment 1.
Before averaging across participants, individual percepts were normalized,
i.e., divided by the corresponding participant’s mean phase duration (cf.
Leopold and Logothetis, 1996). The resulting group level distributions of
percept durations inferred from the target detection task (A) and directly
reported (B) could both be well ﬁtted by a gamma function (black line).
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detection task: M = 2.57, SD = 0.63; direct report: M = 3.92,
SD = 1.55; t(36) = 5.79, p < 0.001].
Baseline percept durations did not differ between left-
(M = 6.07, SD = 3.45) and right-eye [M = 6.23, SD = 3.09;
t(36) = 0.39, p = 0.702], red (M = 6.29, SD = 2.93) and blue
[M = 6.01, SD = 3.58; t(36) = 0.71, p = 0.483], or the later-
on rewarded (M = 5.98, SD = 2.83) and later-on non-rewarded
percept [M = 6.32, SD = 3.63; t(36) = 0.85, p = 0.399]. As
hypothesized, baseline-corrected perceptual dominance durations
of the rewarded percept during conditioning blocks were signiﬁ-
cantly longer than those of the non-rewarded percept [Student’s
t-test t(36) = 2.18, p = 0.018, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.36;
see Figure 3A]. While there was a numerical change for the two
percepts in opposite directions, neither the rewarded nor non-
rewarded percept taken alone changed signiﬁcantly from baseline
to conditioning [t(36) = 1.46, p = 0.152, and t(36) = −1.27,
p = 0.212, respectively]. During extinction, previously rewarded
and non-rewarded percepts did not differ any more [t(36) = 0.47,
p = 0.642]. The extinction-effect, i.e., the interaction between
baseline-corrected rewarded and non-rewarded percept during
conditioning and during extinction, was not signiﬁcant [2 × 2
factorial ANOVA with the factors percept (rewarded vs. unre-
warded) and experimental phase (conditioning vs. extinction):
F(1,36) = 2.83, p = 0.101]. Eye movement recordings in a sub-
set of 18 participants showed no evidence for a difference in the
frequency of eye blinks in the two perceptual states (see Figure
S1 in the Supplementary Material for more details). Moreover,
detailed debrieﬁng at the end of the experiment indicated that
awareness of the aim of the study was generally low (65.5% of
participants correctly guessed the rewarded color in the 2AFC
question which is marginally above chance according to the bino-
mial test: p = 0.068; see Supplementary Material for detailed
results of the debrieﬁng). However, in order to preclude any related
confounding factors that might have driven the observed effect of
reward on perception, we performed a control analysis exclud-
ing participants who showed any signs of possible confounding
factors: (a) awareness of the subjective nature of color changes
(i.e., notiﬁcation of the effect of blinks on color change prob-
ability), (b) reports of any strategy regarding one stimulus or
one color only (e.g., temporarily stop pressing for targets on one
stimulus), (c) many missed targets, resulting in overall less than
70% of time where a percept could be inferred based on the tar-
get performance, (d) strong eye asymmetry or color preference,
which resulted in signiﬁcantly different percept durations dur-
ing the baseline blocks (p < 0.05 of the Mann–Whitney U test
for percept durations of the one vs. the other stimulus). 22 par-
ticipants met at least one of these criteria (n = 5, 1, 12, 9 met
a, b, c, d, respectively). Analysis of the remaining 15 partici-
pants revealed identical results, with a signiﬁcant effect of reward
on median dominance duration [t(14) = 1.85, p = 0.043, one-
tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.48; see Figure S2 in the Supplementary
Material]. Again there was no prolonged effect during extinction
blocks [t(14) = −0.47, p = 0.648], no signiﬁcant extinction effect
[F(1,14) = 1.58, p = 0.230], and neither the rewarded nor non-
rewarded percept taken alone changed signiﬁcantly from baseline
to conditioning [t(14)= 0.78, p= 0.446, t(14)=−1.61, p= 0.129,
respectively].
In Experiment 2, a new group of participants completed the
same task as in Experiment 1, with the only exception that one of
the two perceptual states was now coupled with monetary loss
instead of gain. Targets in catch trials were correctly detected
in M = 93.11% (SD = 7.73). Baseline perceptual durations
determined by the target detection task indicated no signiﬁcant
differences comparing left (M = 4.74, SD = 1.78) and right-
eye [M = 4.99, SD = 1.76; t(33) = 0.99, p = 0.330], later-on
punished (M = 4.98, SD = 1.83) and later-on non-punished
[M = 4.75, SD = 1.71; t(33) = −0.88, p = 0.384] but a sig-
niﬁcantly longer duration of the red (M = 5.30, SD = 1.61) as
the blue percept [M = 4.43, SD = 1.81; t(33) = 4.09, p < 0.001].
Baseline-corrected dominance durations of the percept that was
paired with monetary loss were signiﬁcantly shorter than non-
punished percepts during conditioning blocks [t(33) = 2.77,
FIGURE 3 | Average percept durations as obtained by the target
detection task. Relative to baseline blocks, rewarded percepts were
signiﬁcantly longer than non-rewarded percepts during the conditioning
blocks in Experiment 1 (A). Punished percepts during the conditioning blocks
in Experiment 2 were signiﬁcantly shorter than non-punished percepts
compared to baseline (B). Reward and punishment effects were not
persistent as indicated by no signiﬁcant differences (n.s.) between percept
durations during the extinction blocks. Note: sample sizes were n = 37 and
n = 34 for Experiment 1 and 2, respectively; *p < 0.05, paired t -test. Error
bars denote within-subject SEs.
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p = 0.009, two-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.47; see Figure 3B]. Inter-
estingly, this was due to a signiﬁcant increase of the non-punished
percept [t(33) = 3.77, p = 0.001], whereas the punished per-
cept did not change signiﬁcantly [t(33) = 1.47, p = 0.152]. As
in the ﬁrst Experiment, baseline-corrected percept durations did
not differ any longer during extinction [t(33) = 1.15, p = 0.259]
and there was no signiﬁcant extinction effect [F(1,33) = 0.83,
p = 0.369]. Again, participants were relatively unaware of the
aim of the study (67.7% correctly guessed the punished color in a
2AFCquestion, p= 0.023; see SupplementaryMaterial for detailed
results of the debrieﬁng). To rule out possible effects of binocu-
lar rivalry awareness, voluntary strategies, task performance or
baseline asymmetries, we again applied the same criteria as in
Experiment 1 (n = 6, 4, 12, 9 met criteria a, b, c, d, respectively) to
deﬁne a conservative subsample (n = 15), which yielded identical
results [difference between punished and non-punished percept
t(14) = 2.29, p = 0.038, two-tailed; Cohen’s d = 0.59; increase
of the non-punished percept between baseline and punishment
blocks t(14) = 3.03, p = 0.009, but no difference of the punished
percept t(14) = 1.58, p = 0.136; no prolonged punishment effect
during extinction blocks t(14) = 0.22, p = 0.828; no extinction
effect F(1,14) = 1,54, p = 0.235; see Supplementary Material for
further details].
Combined analysis of data from both experiments revealed
that the increased duration of rewarded percepts in Experiment 1
and the decreased duration of punished percepts in Experiment 2
resulted in a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction effect between type of
conditioning (reward vs. punishment) and percept (conditioned
vs. non-conditioned, F(1,69) = 9.66, p = 0.003 for the whole
samples, and F(1,28) = 7.35, p = 0.011 for the conservative sub-
samples). Thus, reward and punishment had opposite effects on
perceptual dominance durations.
DISCUSSION
The results of our two experiments show that perceptual inference
during binocular rivalry is shaped by its consequences, in analogy
to the well-known effects of instrumental conditioning: Durations
of rewarded percepts were longer than non-rewarded percepts,
whereas punished percepts were shorter than non-punished per-
cepts. Interestingly, conditioning effects seemed to depend, at least
in the punishment experiment, on compensatory changes in the
non-conditioned percept. Whereas punished percept durations
remained largely unchanged, non-punished percepts increased
signiﬁcantly during punishment compared to baseline. This pat-
tern is in line with a longstanding proposition in binocular rivalry
research which states that increasing or decreasing the ‘strength’ of
one stimulus during perceptual competition leads to a compen-
satory decrease or increase of perceptual dominance durations of
the other stimulus whereas dominance durations of the manipu-
lated stimulus stay the same (Levelt’s second proposition, Levelt,
1968; but see also Bossink et al., 1993; Brascamp et al., 2006).
Even though the evidence for such a compensatory change in
dominance durations was less clear in the reward experiment,
one might conclude that this ﬁnding could be speciﬁc to binoc-
ular rivalry. Alternatively, the effects of conditioning on phase
durations could be interpreted as a general increase of percept
durations during conditioning and a relative decrease from this
trend in the non-favorable percept (i.e., the non-rewarded or the
punished percept). Generally increased percept durations during
conditioning might be due to rivalry-speciﬁc long-term effects,
e.g., related to diminishing interocular suppression over time
(Hollins and Hudnell, 1980; Klink et al., 2010), or increased moti-
vation to detect targets, which might have further lowered the
attention to perceptual alternations and thereby increased per-
cept durations (Paffen et al., 2006; Frassle et al., 2014). Lower
attention to perceptual alternations might also explain the gen-
erally longer percept durations in our target detection paradigm.
Importantly, however, the general pattern of opposing reward
and punishment effects on perception will serve as a starting
point for future research investigating whether other forms of
perceptual inference are shaped by instrumental learning in a
similar way.
In both experiments reported here, the effects of conditioning
were no longer detectable as soon as reward or punishment had
been stopped, which is compatible with extinction as observed in
behavioral (Bouton, 2002) as well as emotional learning (Rescorla,
2000; Phelps et al., 2004). Extinction is thought to reﬂect active
learning rather than a passive decay of previously learned asso-
ciations (Bouton, 2002; Hartley and Phelps, 2010). The absence
of prolonged conditioning effects in both our experiments might
therefore point to a continuous adaptation of perceptual infer-
ence to changing conditions. It should be noted, however, that
we did not observe a statistically signiﬁcant reduction of the con-
ditioning effect in the extinction phase, which precludes strong
conclusions regarding extinction effects in our experiment. Future
research might reveal whether effects of conditioning on percep-
tion quickly vanish (as e.g., observed with unconsciously acquired
fear, Raio et al., 2012) or persistently shape future perception based
on the learning history.
Given previous evidence for voluntary inﬂuences on multi-
stable perception (Meng and Tong, 2004; Zhang et al., 2012) one
might wonder whether participants in our study had realized
which percept was more beneﬁcial (i.e., the rewarded percept in
Experiment 1 or the non-punished percept in Experiment 2) and
tried to bias their perception accordingly. However, this interpre-
tation can be discarded for a number of reasons. Most importantly,
our assessment of perception relied on an indirect and objec-
tive measure and was based on a task that was orthogonal to the
actual parameter of interest, that is, change in perceptual domi-
nance duration as a function of conditioning. As a consequence,
the majority of participants remained unaware of the subjective
nature of perceptual alternations, rendering the possibility that
they might have tried to voluntarily inﬂuence perception highly
unlikely. Accordingly, only very few participants applied strate-
gies that could have yielded differential effects on the two rivaling
percepts. Crucially, even after rigorous exclusion of all partici-
pants in whom awareness of rivalry or any use of strategy could be
suspected, the effects of conditioning remained stable. Moreover,
eye tracking analyses indicated that the frequency of eye blinks,
which can induce perceptual switches, was balanced between the
two percepts and was thus unlikely to have inﬂuenced perceptual
dominance durations in any systematic way. For these reasons, the
observed effects on perceptual dominance durations seem likely to
be due to an automatic adaptation of perceptual inference rather
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than being mediated by any voluntary strategy or even a reporting
bias. Our results are thus also in line with ﬁndings of implicit,
i.e., unconscious, effects of reward on behavior (Pessiglione et al.,
2007) and now extended this evidence to the domain of percep-
tion. However, given the dependency of ourmeasure onbehavioral
responses to targets for which we cannot calculate a response bias,
we currently cannot completely exclude the possibility that con-
ditioning affected response selection subliminally (cf. Pessiglione
et al., 2008) and thus biased even our indirect measure of percep-
tion. Evidence from other independent measures of perception
such as pupil diameter (Einhauser et al., 2008) or neural acti-
vation (Haynes and Rees, 2005; Schmack et al., 2013) may help
to further substantiate the notion of conditioned perception by
ruling out the possibility of subliminal conditioning effects on
response selection with even higher certainty. With regard to the
question of involvement of conscious processes, future studies
should also account for the methodologically challenging assess-
ment of contingency awareness (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002).
Since participants in the present study showed a residual albeit low
level of awareness for the contingency of reward and punishment,
the present study cannot claim complete absence of contingency
awareness, but nevertheless provides ﬁrst evidence that perceptual
inference is inﬂuenced by reinforcement independent of voluntary
control.
Our results are in general agreement with studies that reported
effects of current needs and preferences or stimulus value on per-
ceptual inference (Proshansky and Murphy, 1942; Schafer and
Murphy, 1943; Haggard and Rose, 1944; Bruner and Goodman,
1947; Balcetis and Dunning, 2006, 2010; Fleming et al., 2010;
Summerﬁeld and Koechlin, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011c; Bal-
cetis et al., 2012; Radel and Clement-Guillotin, 2012; Schmack
et al., 2013). However, our ﬁndings go substantially beyond this
previous work in several ways. First, unlike prior studies we
did not rely on participants’ report but used an orthogonal
task to test our hypothesis with regard to changes in percep-
tion that was independent of participants’ intention and report
bias (only Balcetis et al., 2012; Schmack et al., 2013, used some
report-independent measures of perception). Second, we could
demonstrate that perceptual inference is not only affected by
the predeﬁned value of a stimulus, but that it is shaped adap-
tively by its consequences. Third, conditioning exerted its effects
on perception implicitly, that is, without observers even being
aware of the possibility of such effects. Finally, we could show
opposite effects of reward and punishment, in analogy to the
effects of instrumental conditioning on action. The latter point
is of particular interest when discussing our ﬁndings in rela-
tion to the earlier observation that stimuli previously paired with
reward are more difﬁcult to ignore in an attentional selection
task (Anderson et al., 2011a). It has been suggested that pairing
of stimuli with punishment would also render them more salient
and therefore similarly difﬁcult to ignore (Anderson, 2013). In
fact, visual stimuli that have been paired with an aversive event
or negative gossip tend to dominate perception during binoc-
ular rivalry, i.e., are more likely to be selected by perceptual
inference (Alpers et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2011c). In contrast,
pairing the outcome of perceptual inference with an aversive con-
sequence in our study (Experiment 2) yielded the opposite effect
with predominance of the non-punished percept over the pun-
ished one. A crucial difference between the present and earlier
studies regards the precise subject of associative pairing: In pre-
vious studies (Alpers et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2011c), negative
values were associated with a stimulus, whereas in our present
study values were associated with a percept, that is, the outcome
of perceptual inference. A possible conclusion is that changing
the value of a stimulus, no matter whether positive of negative,
increases its affective salience, which in turn facilitates its access
to awareness. In contrast, when it is the outcome of perceptual
inference that is associated with a value, the effect depends on
the sign of this value: a positive value will increase the prob-
ability of the associated perceptual outcome, while a negative
value decreases its probability. To the best of our knowledge,
our study is the ﬁrst to directly demonstrate such differential
effects of conditioning with positive and negative consequences
on perception.
In conclusion, our results suggest that the inferential pro-
cesses that give rise to our conscious perceptual experience
are subject to the same well-established effects that instru-
mental learning is known to have on action selection. This
ﬁnding narrows the gap between the conceptually separated
domains of perception and action and is therefore of fun-
damental importance for the understanding of the adap-
tive brain mechanisms underlying the perception of and the
interaction with the environment. It will be an intriguing
challenge for future research to elucidate the neural mecha-
nisms involved in the shaping of perception by instrumental
learning.
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